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Abstract: The sociological nature of value (from a general or symbolic economic 
perspective) is explored with an eye toward comprehending the riddle of US 
debt and how debt functions as imperial tribute in the waning days of US global 
hegemony.
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When toddlers flush money down toilets they demonstrate the nominalist bent 
of the under-socialized person: money appears to the child to be nothing but 
funny green paper to be drawn on, mutilated, and, finally, remanded to the void. 
Even card-carrying critical theorists are hard pressed, in this and similar cases, to 
celebrate the revolutionary destruction of crystallized value: “That was our din-
ner, naughty!” “I no eat paper!” “Well, no ice cream for you!” 
 Society expends vast resources converting these little anarchists into their 
polar opposites: naive realists who perceive the world, both social and natural, 
as sparkling with value and other enchantments. While we may forgive the ordi-
nary citizen, plagued as they are with everyday common sense even professional 
critics (swerving between crude materialism and enchanted realism) usually fail 
to sufficiently unravel the enigma of value. Despite what many Marxists believe, 
Marx did not fully comprehend the social nature of value until the late 1850s1. 
His first ‘perfect’ analysis of value would not come until the publication of the 
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Critique of Political Economy2.  There is an often subtle but nonetheless decisive 
shift in Marx’s thinking that separates the Grundrisse3 on one side, from the Cri-
tique, the first volume of Capital4, and the 1865 address, Value, Price, and Profit5 
on the other. Those that would weld all of Marx’s writings into one homogenous 
block all suffer from the same thing: a naive realist ontology –– ideal-typical 
expressions of this kind of anti-sociological realism can be found in Hilferding’s 
Finance Capital 6, and more recently in Postone7, David Harvey’s close (but no 
cigar) readings of Capital, and Kliman’s “intrinsic value” thesis8. Instead of taking 
Marx at his word we find, in Postone for example: value is the socially totalized 
and interdependent and self-mediating categorically instrumental and generally 
compulsive and historically determinate theory of abstract labor. 
 Abstract labor must be some kind of thing that we can get our hands on, 
we are told, because thoughts and ways of thinking exist only in the minds of 
individuals. The attempt to avoid psychological reductionism (and, no doubt, we 
must avoid that) leads off into these absurd notions because what all but a few 
Marxists have realized is that collective consciousness (social) is not reducible to 
consciousness (individual) –– Marxists generally do not have a sociological grasp 
of collective consciousness, therefore, if value is, as Marx says, purely ideal, they 
conclude that because consciousness is only in the brains of individuals, there 
must be some non-ideal supplement that accompanies the form of thought. Or, 
conversely, it is simply not ideal, though Marx says that, so it must be something 
non-ideal, i.e., natural. 
 For a more thorough critique of bad value thinking see Worrell9. It is im-
possible to read Capital with the reductive gaze of a nominalist, to positivists of 
all stripes it appears as just so much mystical mumbo jumbo, but a realist gaze 
can effortlessly filter out all the elements that run counter to Marx’s mature in-
sight into value. 
     
Value
Marx makes perfectly clear that, first, exchange-value is identical with the con-
cept of value. In “Value, Price, and Profit”, for example, Marx says that when he 
speaks of value he always has in mind exchange-value10. We can certainly discuss 
value separately from the exchange relation. The substance of value is labor in 
the abstract, however, Marx has a name for the analysis of value apart from the 
exchange relation as realization: “abstract value”11. How many Marxists have ever 
noticed this phrase or, if they have, would know what it means? 
 In all of Marx’s works the precise phrase “abstract value” appears only a 
few times (Engels used it once in a non-economic context; Marx used it in a foot-
note in the Critique; and in Capital it appears once. Marx says, “If we say that, as 
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values, commodities are simply congealed quantities of human labour, our analy-
sis reduces them, it is true, to the level of abstract value, but does not give them 
a form of value distinct from their natural forms. It is otherwise in the value-re-
lation of one commodity to another”12. His point here is that, yes, we (those who 
alienate the living) can reduce a thing down to an abstraction (value is abstract 
labor or “labor pure and simple” without regard for anything in particular) but, 
paradoxically, the abstraction, divorced from any relation, appears (and can only 
appear) to befuddled consciousness in its concrete or natural form (hence, the 
illusion of inherent or intrinsic value). The secondary alienation following the 
first alienation (here we arrive at the concept of ‘compound alienation’) brings 
the abstract thing back around to the concrete domain but in a mystified form. 
We are supposed to know that, as far as value goes, its “objective character” is 
“purely social” and “can only appear in the social relation between commodity 
and commodity”13 and that value “differs from its stiff and starchy existence as a 
body”14. Value, as a moral subject-substance, “is realized only in exchange”, that 
it “emerges” in the relation between two commodities15, that matter has nothing 
to do with value itself and is, indeed, the total disregard of matter and material16, 
and that value is, beneath its obfuscating but expressive material shell, the rela-
tion between people17 and “only within the limits of this relation”18. Now, try get-
ting any of this across to critical theorists who point to some isolated physical 
object outside any exchange relation whatsoever when asked to show you value 
or who wonder, after 30 or more years of pondering Marx, what he meant by the 
phrase “purely social.” 
 Value is already an abstraction (concrete labor rendered generic, labor 
without regard for particularity) but disconnecting value from the social rela-
tions of exchange renders it doubly abstract (abstract here means one-sided and 
divorced from its social ground). This is why “exchange-value” is the necessary 
mode of expression of “value.” Again, if we mistakenly regard value as a double 
concept then there is one that is social and one external to the social or moral 
domain. We would have, then, a social value and then some kind of non-social 
value somewhere else. Mysterious! This is not social science in any form, rather, 
we are in the presence of Marxist theology. If Marx had been this type of realist 
by the time he published Capital, the brilliant footnote on Peter and Paul19 and 
the related footnote on royalty would have been completely different: 
 Marx: Peter (singularity) knows himself as a human being (universal) in 
the use-value form of Paul (the particular equivalent) who recognizes his claim 
to be a human –– “Peter only relates to himself as a man through his relation to 
another man, Paul, in whom he recognizes his likeness”20. In other words, no Paul, 
no universality. But, of course, for the deluded Peter, he thinks he has an imme-
diate relationship to the universal. Likewise with royalty. “For instance, one man 
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is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on 
the other hand, imagine that they are subjects because he is king”21. 
 Contrast this position with another where Peter, capitalists, vampires, 
Marxologists, and so on, imagine that Peter is not a human being because he is 
recognized by Paul, but, on the contrary, Paul treats and regards Peter the way 
he does because he is obviously already a human being. Here, the status con-
ferred is reversed from ‘he is king because we treat him as such’ to the opposite 
where ‘we treat him like a king because he is the king.’ The same reversal applies 
to things like commodities or gold or any other object invested with authority. 
For the social realist, in contrast, gold has value because we expend time and en-
ergy to extract it from the earth and then use it as a medium of exchange where-
as, for the ordinary realist, we dig up gold because it is value in its gold form. Of 
course, in the bourgeois necroverse, gold really does already have value and we 
will all kill one another to obtain more than our fair share, so, we can go on killing 
one another for it, or, we can break the spell that it holds over people. 
 When the longing gaze is replaced by the gaze of indifference the spell is 
broken22  and, at a minimum, authority devolves into domination, a thing to be 
hated and fought, positively, Marx, or negatively, e.g., Nietzsche23. However, in-
difference toward the authority of social facts is difficult to cultivate (recall the 
monetary toilet training). The use-value (usefulness) of gold contains no value, 
it is not in its materiality that value is located. Here, Marx and Emile Durkheim 
merge with the insight that non-material and even imaginary things can be 
nonetheless objectively real in the eyes of whole classes and even have physical 
effects24. Fetish consciousness perceives value as an external materialized thing 
and only as this material thing. The existence of a god, for example, would not 
constitute a literal truth but would be socially and practically true for millions of 
people. We do not punish children who give up on the tooth fairy but people die 
everyday for their failure to recognize the prevailing god (collective representa-
tion) of their society. Any dumb little use-value can, in some contexts, be imag-
ined to wield awesome powers and some Marxists, like any Average Joe,  do 
confuse use-values with value. 
 Marx’s clumsy adoption of an older terminology (“use-value”) from the 
pre-existing terminology he found in political economy exacerbates the problem. 
What is meant by “use-value” is simple but not obvious, if we decide to retain 
this terminology: use and consumption fall on the side of the concrete and the 
specific, in other words, I may value a thing for whatever reason and say “this is 
a value to me.” At the level of personal psychology, then, it is true that a com-
modity, once sold, can fall out of the exchange relation and, for the owner and 
user, nonetheless retain some sense of being a ‘value’ (not merely utility or use-
fulness) and used as some kind of ‘phallus’ by which to impress others and sig-
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nify social status. Even here, though, it is usually the ‘logos’ of the thing, rather 
than its physical qualities, that matters most: this thing is my BMW. The signi-
fier functions as a vague but prestigious image that bends the mind back to 
the exchange moment, when the owner presumably sacrificed $60,000 for the 
object. For the working person we should excuse this swerve in thought: “If you 
must sweat like a mule to earn your beer,” says Bageant, “you might as well call it 
a value”25. For critical theory, however, we should expect more than fetish delu-
sions. The problem of splitting also plagues our conception of capital just as the 
problem of conflation plagues our conception of prices.
 While many Marxists make the error of duplicating and fetishizing value 
(value fetishism is the splitting of the value concept into two species just as capi-
tal fetishism is the splitting of capital into two species: industrial and financial, 
a split that creates political reverberations, e.g., the old-fashioned populist bank 
fetish we saw in the Bernie Sanders campaign or in the more insidious antise-
mitic demonology of Father Coughlin (the Depression-era ‘Radio Priest’) and his 
successors on the far right in the US that link finance to Judaism and industrial 
production to Christianity26. See the third volume of Capital27 for more on this 
problem of capital fetishism as well as Massing’s classic analysis of reaction-
ary politics28), a few compound their problems by then misconstruing price for 
value. I was once asked how there can be value without a price. Are not profits 
priceless? Where there are prices there are always values we are told. However, 
Marx indicates that price and value are separate concepts and that we can affix a 
price to some object that has no value whatsoever –– here we are in the domain 
of imaginary or fictional (purely “fictitious”) value 29. 
 From another angle, though, where we find prices in the absence of value 
we might use our anthropological eye to locate alternate modes of impersonal 
and authoritative social energies underlying the price/signifier. ‘Price’ is not 
limited to the domain of the economic. Before ‘price’ had anything to do with 
the estimation of commercial values it was related to honor, esteem, and reputa-
tion, and was related to the words ‘praise’ and ‘prize.’ Of course, we might find 
that, yes, the mere act of exchange has been constructed in which dupes pay 
for worthlessness; value is not merely the result of exchange in itself as hardcore 
constructionists would have us believe, otherwise we go no further than notions 
such as the worth of a thing being whatever a person is willing to pay for it30 but 
it might also be the case that what looks like junk is actually a bearer of another 
modality of authority exchangeable for money or convertible into a money form. 
It is probably the case that Baudrillard’s excursions into post-Marxian sign value 
were not as useful as they could have been, however, Bataille’s notion of a ‘gen-
eral economy’31 and E. P. Thompson’s ‘moral economy’32  have been more use-
ful and influential on contemporary thought. One way to sum up the problems 
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raised in the above is to port the triadic simplicity of the commodity over into 
another conceptual matrix: the Lacanian distinction between the real, the sym-
bolic, and the imaginary. As a brief thought experiment, let us dismember the 
commodity: we observe its use-value or utility, we see and evaluate the price, 
which is presumably indicative of its value (jouissance). Where do we locate 
value within Lacan’s now commonplace RSI schema and how will this impinge on 
our comprehension of value not as substance but as subject-substance as Marx 
calls it?
 Any undergraduate can guess that the physical body of the commod-
ity falls into the register of the real but as for the coordinates of value things 
are a bit more tricky. If we locate value within the register of the imaginary we 
thereby situate value within the specular relations the commodity has with an-
other equivalent. True, here is where value makes its appearance for another but 
the consequence will be that we may confuse price and value, confusing objects 
within the sign regime: confusing an index with a symbol. The exchange relation 
is the necessary mode of expression but it is itself not value, or abstract labor 
and price is something altogether different than price. If, however, we locate 
value within the domain of the symbolic then we have shifted our analysis away 
from mere subjectivity, as well as mere intersubjectivity, and into another form 
altogether: absolute subjectivity or, what Durkheim called, collective conscious-
ness. The “externality” of the commodity (Marx) just like the “externality” of any 
social fact (Durkheim) pertains not to the real body of the thing but to its alien 
presence within the mind, bearing down upon us as either an object of desire 
and authority or as an oppressive Thing (Marx’s “nightmare” metaphor) that we 
hate and wish to escape. The world of debt is the place to explore the interpen-
etration of the hated Thing.  
      
Debt
What looks like a pure liability from a personal standpoint appears to another as 
an asset. As such, where populist politicians and consumers quake in fear over 
personal debt and the national debt, the economist sees things in an altogether 
different light33. Under the Fordist regime of capital accumulation the US was a 
lending nation but in the post-Fordist, neoliberal epoch, the lender has become 
a debtor nation and within this new framework asset obligations in the form of 
Treasury bills, and so forth, are no longer fully contained within the traditional 
debt-asset framework. In other words, what if all our worry over national debt 
(US) is the result of an outdated optic? 
 The post-structuralist tendency is to see things like ‘empty signifiers’ 
when, in reality, signifiers are merely borne aloft by forces that have escaped 
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the one-sided analytic gaze. If one cannot see anything but people laboring, 
one discounts other modes of human assemblage and alienated ebullience. In 
fact, many of the instruments circulating in the financial and finance-gambling 
sphere (not to mention religion) are in fact worthless from the standpoint of 
a labor ontology which leads to another erroneous interpretation on the part 
of Marxists, and that is the notion of “hot air” –– that some circulating paper is 
backed or grounded by nothing. Something has to make this ‘air’ hot. This points 
to the one-sided, labor fetish of most brands of orthodox Marxism and and the 
labor theory of value; where we think we see ‘worthless’ scraps of paper floating 
around what we are sometimes missing is that a mere piece of paper can also be 
a piece of institutional authority in paper form backed up (grounded) by some 
other kind of social power34. There can be no comprehensive analysis of econo-
my or political economy in the absence of an accounting for moral economy. 
 In the case of quantitative easing, for example, it was not technically cor-
rect to see it as a case of simply injecting “hot air” currency into the market. The 
Chinese response to QE1 and QE2  suggests that their capital investments were 
being degraded, and they were, but when a carrier battle group conducts train-
ing off the shores of Taiwan it signals that US bonds and currency are backed by 
brute  force and as long as Uncle Sam can force feed debt to nations, US cur-
rency and bonds are ‘worth’ something, they are exchanged, and they stay in 
circulation. In other words, financial dependency and ordinary debt transactions 
on the surface of society masks the essential fact that the US is an imperial su-
perpower and that debt is, to a large degree, imperial tribute that will never be 
repaid. 
 The constant fear of default is largely irrelevant so long as the US main-
tains its position as the global superpower. The US Department of Defense is 
largely a state within the state dedicated to preventing the slide into a symmetri-
cal competition between global hegemons. The full-scale US invasion of Africa 
is largely a check on China; the war in Syria is, largely, a check on Russian access 
to ports and regional influence; the war in Afghanistan is, largely, a war on our 
friends in Pakistan; the war in Iraq is, largely, not a war for petroleum but a mat-
ter of disobedience and punishment35; and the war on terror is the perfect war 
in which to express imperial command and discipline: it can neither be won nor 
lost, it is simply a new matrix for dollarization, reserves denomination, generating 
corporate war profits (nothing beats cost-plus contracts) and creating an obedi-
ent world system with the US at the helm36. 
 Conservatives and liberals alike still think in terms of contractual obliga-
tions and fear that the US is putting itself in a position of dependency upon 
other nations and transnational actors, but, as Durkheim noted, while contracts 
are a form of partial slavery, when you are the global powerhouse, you are a 
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slave to no one which means that contracts are only honored if it is in the inter-
est of the one with all the power. In fact, consider an analogy from the world of 
organized labor: if your union fails to strike or even threaten a work stoppage, 
then it is not a union at all; at best it is a toothless collective bargaining unit that 
will be coerced by more powerful forces. Likewise, if your imperial master fails to 
bomb you periodically or threaten you with a deep recession or the prospects 
of another stone age now and then, they are not much of an imperial master to 
be respected. This is, of course, the function of Trumpism in the US: if you think 
things are bad now (buying our worthless debt, declining wages, environmental 
degradation, and having our troops all over your country, etc.) it could be a lot 
worse, you could have a narcissistic maniac with impulse control problems ten 
feet from the nuclear codes. Of course, this arrangement cannot last forever. 
 Kant believed that a national debt was, ultimately, self-defeating 37and he 
is undoubtedly correct. Eventually, empire will run out of steam and prestige and 
the world will turn against it. As Durkheim insisted, a lone political entity cannot 
stand against the rest of the world for long38. Even now we see, for example in 
the Philippines, a ‘rebalancing’ of dependencies toward China. The neoliberal or-
der will fail, ultimately, because it violates the structure of reason, it is unreason-
able, and violently irrational. The world system is a symbolic universality that en-
compases individual nation-states and their substantive (‘speculative’) relations 
with one another. This is a central point and something that we keep running into 
time and time again: as far as individuals go, the idea of the nation-state is still 
extremely powerful and vastly more important than multi-state conglomerates. 
Brexit! Open borders! New World Order! A bipolar world, as an alternative, is 
one divided against itself with two main blocks serving as countervailing univer-
salities, with some non-aligned leftovers extracting what concessions and deals 
as they can, playing one power off another. Ultimately, though, a world divided 
along binary lines will disintegrate as we saw at the end of the Cold War. The 
current neoliberal system attempts to sharpen the old Fordist logic whereby the 
triad of finance, production, and consumption (a fetish conception if there ever 
was one) is remapped across old geopolitical demarcations. Ultimately, Hegel 
is right: reason has a structure and it is cunning. When social organization be-
comes irrational it will destroy itself and a debt-tribute-finance universality is an 
insult to reason and national sentiments and values. 
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